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AMILY dissolution is an all too familiar feature of the present-day
-'American scene. In so far as it occurs as a result of death or physical
or mental disability, the problems connected with it are thought to lie
generally in the field of responsibility of the medical profession. But
when the means employed to accomplish family dissolution are manmade, as in the case of divorce, we find the problem, in both its remedial
and preventive aspects, lying at the door of the social sciences. One
of these is the law. That these professional groups view statistics of
widespread disintegration with interest, not to say alarm, is obvious.
The best evidence of this concern is the stream of proposals made to
remedy the situation 2 In this effort to find something to ameliorate
the situation, if not to prevent it, the legal profession has made itself
heard.
If we can bring ourselves to see the dissolution process through the
eyes of the family which is facing the challenge, we shall probably
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understand more dearly the task which confronts those who would
reform existing institutions. Basically, it seems to be something like
this: One spouse (possibly both), for reasons satisfactory to himself,
finds his current domesticity intolerable. He feels he must do something about it. If he were less emotionally involved or better prepared
to handle the difficulty, he would do well to take it at once to some
person who was really qualified to help him. But, too often, he either
does not realize the complexity of the problem, become aware of his own
limitations, or acknowledge them until too late-if at all. Thinking in
lay terms, he tends to view the matter superficially rather than getting
to the core of it. In seeking a remedy, he looks not so much for an
over-all solution as for an immediate way of escape for himself. He
commits the cardinal error of making what one may call a "selfdiagnosis" and comes up with something bearing a familiar labeldivorce. His approach is somewhat comparable to tha, of a man suffering from some physical indisposition who ignores the professional aid
doctors might give him and makes his way to the corner drug store.
There, he purchases a bottle of patent medicine with a familiar label,
looking for anticipated immediate relief and too often not realizing the
far-reaching consequences of his act. To relieve himself of personal discomfort, the domestic sufferer often is content, consciously or otherwise,
to "kiil" his family. He tends to equate personal freedom and divorce.
What follows is the normal result of his incompletely-considered action,
of his underestimating the nature and complexity of the problem, of his
believing that if one obvious portion of the difficulty is solved, all will
be well.
The lawyer to whom the spouse takes his overripe domestic problem
is often not so much asked for professional advice, as told what to do.
There are many times when the client wants a divorce and is determined
to have a divorce rather than the sound advice the lawyer would give
him. He will go to any lawyer who will get him a divorce, whether or
not it is good for him. The ensuing court proceeding, at least in orthodox divorce courts, is too often an extreme: perhaps a rugged domestic
battle, with no holds barred; or a spiritless routine in which the spouses
have settled their difficulties ahead of time and merely go through the
required motions in the court room to satisfy either the meticulous judge
or the legislature which originally laid down the basic rules of the
contest.
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In the present paper, we are not concerned with concocting a proposal to prevent family dissolution. It has been around for a long time;
and whether or not it is here to stay, at least it is not likely to be removed from the scene at once by some magical formula being pronounced over it with proper arcane incantations. What we are concerned
with is a more realistic, and, therefore, a better, means to accomplish this
dissolution. Specifically, why divorce? Is it necessary that the legal
concept which we describe by the label divorce be the means employed
for an orderly and public dissolution of the family which has "died"?
May there not be some other concept which will be more responsive
to the situation actually presented by the restless spouse, more flexible
in the hands of the administrators, more useful to the people involved,
and, therefore, more acceptable and advantageous to all concerned?
I
WHAT Is WRONG WITH DIVORCE?

Certainly, if divorce is already an effective and useful procedure,
there is no reason to jettison it in calm weather. But if, as would
appear, it has become a storm center' and a Jonah is sought, we should
not shrink from the drastic act of replacing it with something more suitable. It is logical, therefore, to inquire at the outset, what is wrong with
divorce.
The answer to this question depends, in some measure, upon the
group to which it is addressed. For example, suppose that we address
it to that vague and unorganized group which we are accustomed to
speak of as the general public. The main characteristic of this group is
that its members are probably not too well informed about divorce in
the first place. What they know is second-hand, by way of hearsay, and
may reflect the efforts of speakers and writers who have axes of their
own to grind. To such people, divorce probably connotes an unedifying
spectacle. What they are prone to notice is the "symptom" divorce,
rather than the more fundamental and less obvious "disease"-whatever
that may be. They see, at times, a dramatic and often lurid courtroom
battle, so often portrayed on the front pages of the more sensational
newspapers. They tend to find it easy to become partisan and take
sides in the contest, to jump to conclusions without having all the facts
before them. They do not always hear about the uncontested cases
See John Bartlow Martin, Divorce, Saturday Evening Post, Nov. i,

1958,

p.

19.
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which take two or three minutes to try. So, to the public, divorce is
a misleading label. Too often, they look no further.
If the question is addressed to the spouses, we may expect to get
a somewhat different answer. Divorce may appear in one light prospectively, and in another in retrospect. It promises and may provide freedom, but with so many loose hanging ends often the final result may be
worse than the initial condition. In retrospect, too often it is not a
thrilling prison-break, but a catastrophe in which a deceased family is
given decent burial, while its members are afforded as quiet a respite
as the public conscience respecting the tragedy allows. In retrospect, it
"is clearer that divorce is not merely the problem of a single discontented spouse or a pair of sparring partners. Rather, it is too often
the problem of a whole family, in which the innocent bystanders are
caught up by and become victims of forces not of their own making. To
the spouses, therefore, divorce tends to be treacherous.
If the question is addressed to the State in a democratic society, the
-undesirable characteristics of divorce appear in the area of public relations. Divorce statistics advertise a civilization for better or for worse.
Washing dirty personal linen in public may have value as a means of
satisfying morbid curiosity. Whether it has other public advantages is
debatable. It is doubtful if it is an aid to our side in any ideological war,
such as that in which we are presently engaged. A persuasive argument
may be advanced in support of the proposition that divorce has outlived
whatever usefulness it may have had. As an exhibit A of the good
American way of life, divorce is poor public relations.
There are many objections that may be lodged against divorce, but
for our purposes, it will be sufficient to refer to these three: It is misleading to the general public. It is treacherous to the spouses. It is
poor public relations for the State. Since it has these undesirable characteristics should we at least attempt to reform it, or to replace it with
something better?
A program for reforming divorce does not appear very promising.
For various reasons, the subject is so controversial that it is difficult to
get any agreement on it. Discussion of the subject leads often to heat
rather than light. The religious factors implicit in our conception of
civilized family life necessarily come to the fore in any proposals and
provide a basis for long and frequently fruitless argument. Supporters
of states' rights principles sometime find the divorce laws of their own
jurisdiction superior to those of alien commonwealths. Orthodox rem-
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.edies offer little promise. The idea of a unifying federal statute seems
to be postponed until there is an enabling constitutional amendment.
The Commissioners on Uniform State Laws have no recommendations.'
But the basic obstacle to such change would seem to be more fundamental than these. There are many people who would like to reform
divorce. Each one of them, however, is a member of his own family.
That family is largely unique. Life as a member of it has made an
impression on him. Consciously or unconsciously, his experience has
-colored his point of view, and efforts to discuss divorce bring up in his
mind elements in that background. Divorce comes home so close to
the threshold of each one of us that it is very difficult to be impersonal
about it. It will probably be easier, then, to replace divorce than to
give it such a drastic face-lifting that its old acquaintances will not sooner
or later recognize it.
If a replacement is in order, it is possible that the public will expect
proposals for an improved alternative to come first from representatives
of some of the other social sciences. 5 What should the law do about it?
In one sense, it is easier for the bar to "let George do it." In another
sense, however, the fact that the public is turning elsewhere for this sort
of guidance means that the legal profession is challenged to keep pace
with the interest and progress displayed by these other professional
groups. At present, divorce is a legal concept. If there is to be a replacement from outside the field of law, the public may interpret the
inaction of the bar as a retreat, a cession of territory previously occupied.
In the past, the bar has ceded territory to .various lay agencies, and in
trying to recover lost ground, it has involved itself in the conflict of interests which we call unauthorized practice of law.." If lawyers have
"The annual report of the Commissioners for 1958, perhaps significantly, carries

no Uniform or Standard Divorce Act. A proposed act prepared by the Women's Bar
Association is still far from widely acceptable, and the Interprofessional Commission on
Marriage and Divorce still has, after several years, no specific proposals in this area.
The interest of social workers and marriage counsellors, not to mention psychiatrists,
needs no emphasis here. For a comprehensive article giving the sociological point of
view, see Elliott, The Scoe and Meaning of Divorce, in BECKER AND HILL, FAMILY
MARRIAGE AND PARENTHOOD 669 et seq. (2d ed. 1955).
"The reaction of the legal profession to this form of lay competition has been

restrictive legislation accompanied by vigorous prosecution of "lay trespassers" on the
-,exclusive domain of the bar. More promising are agreements concluded between the
bar and representatives of interested lay groups. Still more recent is the emphasis on
the Lawyers Referral Service and the Legal Aid movement, designed to acquaint the

.public with the value of a lawyer's services, rather than to try to legislate the man in
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something to say about family dissolution, therefore, they should say it,
for their own sakes. Participation and continued interest on the part
of the lawyer should, moreover, make a favorable impression on the
man in the street. There is also the possibility that what lawyers
have to offer may turn out to be more useful in the long run than a
solution proceding from those trained in different professional disciplines. One cannot be certain of this, but neither is there any reason
supinely to assume that the bar's contribution inevitably will be so inferior in competition as not to merit careful consideration. Lawyer motives in this respect may be enlightened self-interest or idealism. In
either event, if their proposal should be accepted, the public would be
the ultimate and possibly the appreciative beneficiary.
The lawyer may find the existing concept of divorce unsatisfactory
in many respects. For example, the court which handles the matter
may be in need of modernization; the concept of family dissolution may
call for complete re-examination; or the grounds on which the dissolution
may be granted by law may be in need of re-orientation. In this context,
the word "division" is critical and is the standard by which the existing
court, concept, and grounds are to be judged. If they are found to be
wanting, the argument will be strengthened that a replacement of divorce is indicated.
A. Divided Authority
The present judicial machinery for granting family dissolution is
based on a division of responsibility. In an earlier day, divorce was
granted by the legislature.7 This approach may have been, and probably was, attacked by observers because it involved projecting the private
lives of families into the arena of politics. It may have been obnoxious
to the sensitive members of the families because it required a certain
amount of invasion of family privacy. It may have been so expensive
that family dissolution was, in fact, available only for those who had a
great deal of money. Desertion was said to be the poor man's divorce.'
the street into the law office. In August 1958, the American Bar Association Section
of Family Law came into existence.
'"The pre-1857 judicial divorce, known as divorce a mensa et thoro, was until
the Matrimonial Causes Act, 1957, no more than a form of judicial separation and did
not put an end to the marriage; only Parliament or death could do that." Graveson,
The Background of the Century, in GR.AvEsON & CRANE, EDS., A CENTURY OF FAMwrLY
LAW 5 (1957).

See also COMPTON, CAS S ON DoMEsTC RELATIONS i50 (1951)o

See PARRy, Concerning Mr. Justice Maule, in
(1922).

WHAT THE JUDGE THOUGHT 131
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But it had one good point-responsibility for handling the whole matter
rested with a single department of government, the legislature, which
could be held accountable.
At a later period, the legislature, for reasons satisfactory to itself,
divided the task of family dissolution, delegating administration to the
courts, but retaining basic control over policy. Today, the public cannot, therefore, easily pin down responsibility. The legislature, in considering proposals for reform, works necessarily by remote control. Its
members, their attention distracted by hundreds of other items, are
often too easily impressed by pressure groups, each of which has its own
private objectives. The resulting statute may not, accordingly, be really
generally acceptable.
The executive branch as the locus of responsibility in family dissolution is another distinct possibility. Administrative commissions staffed
by experts have proliferated in recent years and have performed varied
and difficult tasks with considerable eclat. But here, again, there is
reason to proceed with caution. Even though we are dealing in part
with the dissolution of a status in its human aspects, there are inevitably
problems of property to be dealt with. Those property problems are not
too different from property problems where the adversaries are not H
and W. The parties with such interests deserve due process and equal
protection. They are more likely to receive these guarantees in proceedings under judicial control. Add to this the reluctance of lawyers to
make a complete break with the past, and the matter is shunted back to
the judiciary.
There is no reason to believe that the judiciary desires the sole responsibility for the dissolution of families. But it may be argued persuasively that properly-established family courts9 can do a better task
of producing a satisfactory solution of the complex problems involved
than can agencies of either of the other two branches of government.
The judiciary can experiment. The common law is famous for its
ability to proceed on a trial-and-erroi basis. There is no reason to
assume that its ingenuity, resourcefulness, and ability to respond to a
challenge have deteriorated during the years to the point at which such
a burden as is presently proposed would crush or discourage its votaries.
Rather, one would anticipate a spirited competition by adventurous
young lawyers for places on such tribunals where there would be a
chance to break trail.
See Alexander, The Family Court of the Future, 36 J. Am. JuD. Soc. 38 (x952).

22.4
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B. Adversary Proceeding
In retrospect, we have available for examination the experience of
two groups of tribunals, civil and ecclesiastical, in dealing with family
dissolution.10 During the middle ages, the ecclesiastical courts operated
with considerable effectiveness. They got along without the modern
concept of divorce. As they viewed the matter, marriage was indissoluble. It was a sacrament. The third party was the Deity. The
Church functioned in what amounted to a condition of life-long supervision over the members of families. The only comparable modern
concept is probation. When domestic discord requiring litigation arose
in the church courts, it was solved generally in one of two ways. If the
domestic difficulty causing the litigation was of a certain sort and originated prior to the marriage ceremony, an annulment of the marriage
bond was permitted, on the theory that the parties never, in fact, had
been married5 they had merely gone through a ceremony which of itself,
because of an existing bar, was not presently effective to make them
H and W. If the marriage originally was valid, the parties might have a
judicial separation. One of the characteristics of ecclesiastical jurisdiction
was that the sanctions1' which might be imposed on litigants rested on
the conscience of the litigant and were not limited to his economic and
social personality. Specific performance of a decree of a church court
might be expected to accomplish many desired domestic results.
In due course, the ecclesiastical establishment relinquished its control
over domestic affairs, and the civil authority took control.12 When the
civil patterns and theories were being laid down by the legislatures,
however, the framers did not look to the experience of the church courts.
Particularly in the matter of theory, they developed something newdivorce, the gateway to a possible remarriage. Since they were civilians,
they took their models from the traditions of the common law. There
they saw trial by jury, but prior to that, perhaps, trial by combat,' 3 and
came up with an adversary process. There is no reason to decry completely this form of testing facts; on the other hand, there is no reason
to overvalue it. Whatever its effectiveness elsewhere, when applied
1"

The contrasting methods of handling these cases in ecclesiastical and civil courts

are discussed in Scott, Nallity of Marriagein Canon Law and English Law, 2 TORONTO
L. REV. 319 (1938); VIRTUE, FAMILY CASES IN COURT (1956).
'See 3 BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES 101.
22See x HOLDSWORTH, A HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW 6zx el seq. (19Z2).
1S See PLuCKNETT, A CONCISE HISTORY OF THE COMMON LAW t tct
elq.
(4th
ed. 1948).
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to the dissolution of families, it has limitations. In the light of our
present discussion, one of those limitations is that it tends to foment
"division."
The domestic relation is unique, because the parties to it essentially
are not supposed to be dealing at arm's length. The adversary process
is designed for conflicts between persons who are dealing at arm's length.
If H and W both want freedom, they are in basic agreement as to a
solution, even though they may be hostile to each other. To require
them to submit to an adversary litigation is unrealistic. Moreover, if
only one spouse wants a divorce, the statutory requirements of the adversary process make it necessary for him to prove some marital dereliction on the part of the other. This requirement subtly suggests building
up a case before the matrimonial rift becomes an open break. The
building-up process may involve jockeying for position. This tends to
place a premium on discovering and remembering domestic differences
and faults and, so, to exacerbate the normal factors of domestic friction-minutiae which if left to themselves might be forgiven and
forgotten.
We shall get a dearer picture of what is happening if we look past
the label-divorce-to the events which are actually taking place. These
events are properly to be described by the word "dissolution," which
is not the same as the word "battle." An adversary litigation is a
battle, not a dissolution. But we should not stop merely by identifying
divorce as a "dissolution." There are various sorts of legal dissolutions.
They may be distinguished by what it is which is being dissolved. If
that subject is a property interest, a business concern, the illustrations
are: a decedent's estate, a bankrupt's estate, a defunct corporation. The
issues are economic-who owns, who is entitled to, what? But there
is another form of dissolution which is primarily not commercial, not
property, not an arm's length matter. To this second class, we may
apply the term fiduciary. Illustrations are: settlement of a trust estate,
termination of a relationship between attorney and client, and finally a
dissolution of a family for man-made reasons.
The use of the word "fiduciary" in this connection is correct, but not
sufficiently precise. There are degrees of the fiduciary quality. A
trust estate involves primarily property. An attorney-client relationship
involves a professional relationship. A family relationship, it is submitted, has even -a higher fiduciary quality. The Roman Catholic
Church recognizes something of this distinction. It calls marriage
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a sacrament.' 4 In a lay context, the word "sacrament" is perhaps not
appropriate. But whatever the word used, the family relationship is
dearly sai generis--something very special. Its dissolution calls for
something very special in nature.
Analysis should go beyond the nature of the concept to the remedy
-what is the object of the proceeding? If divorce were a simple matter, like an ordinary civil action for damages, there might be more reason
to supply it with an adversary setting. But it is not simple. The
Supreme Court of the United States tells us that it is divisible. 15 The
normal extension of that principle would require three different sorts
of trial. Where the family property is to be divided, the procedure for
settling a fiduciary estate would seem appropriate. When the custody
of the children is at stake, the interest of the spouses is subordinate to
what the State regards as the best interests of the children-a juvenile
court concept. When one meets the fundamental question--shall the
family be dissolved?-the remedy of an adversary action is used completely out of context. It is suggested that more suitable would be a
proceeding in which the best interests of the "family" were to be determined impersonally by the State. A civil court may decide these
interests in terms of the here and now; an ecclesiastical court would, no
doubt, give much consideration to the family's welfare in the hereafter.
In a properly-planned domestic dissolution, the first issue should
be-is this family "dead"? If the question is answered in the negative,
then one would expect to see some efforts by qualified persons, among
whom would be numbered nonlawyers, to revive it and set it functioning
again under its own power. On the other hand, if the answer is in the
affirmative, there is a very real problem remaining-what shall be done
with the people, the members of the family? What is best for them?
" WEnsT'S NEw INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY

(zd ed.

1948)

defines "sacra-

ment": "n. One of certain religious acts, ceremonies, or practices distinguished from all
others in Christian rites as having been observed or recognized by Christ and given
a certain character by him. According to some, sacraments were initiated by Christ...
as the visible means by which Divine grace is sought and conferred; according to others,
they are observed in memory of him as a sign, seal or symbol of a Christian experience
or profession. In most cases a sacrament is administered by a clergyman and to those
only who have fulfilled the conditions considered proper to its valid reception. The'
Roman Catholic and the Eastern churches recognize seven sacraments (or generally
called 'Mysteries' in the latter) viz., baptism, confirmation, the Eucharist, penance, extreme unction, holy orders and matrimony. In general, Protestants accept only two
sacraments, baptism, and the Lord's Supper...
.
" Estin v. Estin, 339 U.S. 541, 549 (t948) '"The result in this situation is to
make the divorce divisible... ."
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Who shall decide what is best? The court signs the "death certificate,"
the social organism may have expired, but the individual members
of the group have further to go. At least the law should help them on
their way. The deceased family may deserve an appropriate funeral,
but the members are entitled to as untraumatic a transition as can be
devised. Divorce too often tends to place the corpse on a sort of
barbaric pyre and to invite all the neighbors to view the ghastly show.
It pours oil on the troubled flames. It is undesirable because it depends
on a subordinate issue-the wish of the so-called "innocent" spouse.
C. Fault
The third aspect of divorce which is objectionable because of the
presence of the element of division is the basis on which dissolution is
judicially decreed."' If we believe the legislature, a family is to be
considered "dead" because of committed fault. The theory seems to be
that the spouses made certain allegations and commitments, either express or implied, at the time of the wedding. If the allegations proved
untrue, an annulment might follow at the request of the innocent spouse.
If the commitments or promises were not carried out after marriage,
the innocent spouse might ask for a divorce. In other words, the basic
theory was one of fault of one spouse against the other. This ground
did not prove sufficiently inclusive. In the course of time, two other
categories of grounds had to be added. One of these was misfortune,
mental as well as physical.' The other, in some jurisdictions, was an
agreement of the spouses, to separate, persisted in for the statutory
period."'
By making fault the basic ground for divorce, the legislature, no
doubt unwittingly, has tended to encourage each spouse to assemble
evidence of all matrimonial derelictions by the other. Such ammunition,
8

" MADDEN, PERSONS AND DOMESTIC RELATIONS z6a

(1931):

"An action for di-

vorce, though a civil action, partakes of the character of neither an action ex contractu
nor an action ex delicto. It is neither an action at law nor a suit in equity in the
ordinary sense. Nevertheless, in exercising the jurisdiction conferred by statute, the
courts are largely governed by the rules of the English Ecclesiastical Court, except in
so far as that law has been modified by statutes and though a suit for divorce is not a
suit in equity, and therefore not within the ordinary jurisdiction of the chancery court,
yet, except as the procedure may be governed by statute, the courts will apply the rules
and principles of equity. The ecclesiastical court, of course, functioned without a jury,
and its decrees were mainly in personam, hence its procedure resembled that of equity

much more than that of the law courts."
" Some 28 jurisdictions have statutes authorizing divorce on grounds of insanity.
1
"E.g., N.C. GEN. STAT. § 50-6 (1957).
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one supposes, should be carefully stored away in some secure place,
because it may come in handy someday. Each spouse, to protect himself, should be encouraged to learn his legal rights promptly and stand
on them. If he fails to do so, a series of rules such as recrimination,'9
condonation, connivance, may rise up to bar him when he finally gets
around to asking for release from his "intolerable" situation. He is,
in effect, to be penalized for not having insisted to the full upon his
legal rights. He will find himself better off in a crisis if he learns
continuously to jockey for legal position. There is no reason to labor
the point that in such an atmosphere, the spouse who really wants to
try to keep the family together has one, if not two, strikes against him
from the start.
We take issue with fault, moreover, as a suitable ground for family
dissolution. Fault may be a factor in a proceeding for a distribution of
family property or in the awarding of alimony. But fault should occupy
a very subordinate position when the court faces the responsibility of
deciding whether a particular family is "dead" or attempts to give aid
and comfort to the innocent victims of a broken home. There is some
reason to wonder if there are really as many innocent spouses as the
records in divorce cases would seem to suggest, although there certainly
may be innocent children."0 The main objection, however, to using fault
as a ground for divorce seems to be that it oversimplifies the situation.
Fault of one of the spouses against the other focuses attention on the
relationship between the spouses. At the same time, it tends to obscure
that other and equally significant relation which is created by ceremonial
marriage and which exists, as a matter of law, between the two spouses
and the State. The fact that H is cruel to W may or may not affect
the nature of this second obligation.
Marriage is generally thought of as a three-party affair. The third
party under civil law is the State. H and W assume private obligations
to each other. The marriage ceremony or the common-law marriage
meeting of the minds is the symbol of this relation. At the same time,
when the two parties procure a marriage license and then use it, they
become licensees of the State for certain public, as well as private, purposes. The nature of this second obligation has not been too dearly
"

Some 30 jurisdictions have recognized recrimination by statute. See x7o A.L.R.

1076 (-947).
20 Law and Contemporary Problems devoted an entire issue to "Children of Divorced Parents," io LAW & CONTEMP. PROB. 697-864 (1944).
CHILDREN OF DIVORCE (1953).

See also DESPERT,
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defined, either by the legislature or by the courts. But it is obvious that
it exists. Therefore, while a divorce seems directed primarily against
one of these bonds, the dissolution of the family by judicial decree with
privilege of starting a new family necessarily would seem to involve the
severing of both of them. Whatever concept we use in the future in
place of divorce, it should be dearly understood by the public as designed
to accomplish these two objects.
These, then, are the three most compelling objections to the use of
divorce as a means of dissolving the family: (i) It represents divided
authority, split control, which, it may be argued, is fundamentally an
unsound arrangement for something as important as that with which
we are dealing. (2) Because it is adversary, it tends to aggravate any
existing marital differences by offering inducements to the litigigusminded spouse and to blow sparks into flames. (3) It offers "fault"
between H and W as a basic ground for dissolution, and thereby seriously oversimplifies the problem. By the continued use of divorce,
the public may be misled, the spouses deceived, the interest of State
slighted.
II

-

A PROPOSAL FOR A REMEDY
A possible remedy would eliminate the concept of divorce entirely.
This would leave a gap which would have to be filled. Of course, there
is always the possibility of just leaving the gap. This, however, does
not seem realistic. Even the Roman Catholic Church does not go that
far. It grants annulment and separation. An alternate concept, therefore, is necessary. What is to be? Unless it promises better results,
there is not much use in attempting to implement it. Neither will the
problem solve itself. There have been "dead" fairilies, and no doubt
for a long time to come they will continue to present a problem. The
real alternative is whether to leave them unburied or see that they have
decent interment and that their members are cared for.
Any alternative solution which is proposed should be the responsibility of and under the sole control of a single authority, which should
have power to experiment, amend, and improve, as circumstances appear
to require. It should offer the public not a battle betweenthe spouses on
the essential question, but a dissolution of a highly fiduciary status, something even more unique than the dissolution of a status between feudal
lord and serf. It should provide due process and equal protection when
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dealing with economic problems, but it should be directed primarily to
considering the social and spiritual factors implicit in any family relation-

ship. Finally, it should recognize dearly the presence of two bonds,
both of which are to be severed, one of them private, the other public.

The main advantage of this sort of approach to the problem of family
dissolution is that it would wipe the slate dean and allow a fresh start.

A dear, but not too drastic, break with the past, a new beginning in an
untainted environment at least holds out a promise of success which may
be sufficiently encouraging to sustain its proponents during the inevitable

and trying period of trial and error until the new system is generally
accepted.
A. A Family Court
-Theundivided responsibility for family dissolution under the present
proposal should be lodged with the judiciary. The court should be
given authority, by rule, to set up specialized tribunals to handle these
matters, to determine the policy, and to work out the details of the administration. It should have available machinery to insure equal protection of the law and due process for the property interests of those who
come before it. At the same time, it should operate in an individualized
manner in its handling of the human factors, so that the public may
feel that what is done is not so much to the litigant as for him. The
proceeding should be nonadversary; if necessary, even therapeutic. The
new tribunal should be staffed by specially-trained personnel.. To supply
a steady stream of qualified judicial officers, including lawyers, there
should be a strengthening of the law school courses in family law.21 In
each community, there should be developed a "pool" of trained practitioners from among whom selection can be made for judge of the family
court.
The court should deal with three major types of problems. In the
first instance, it should determine whether or not the family is "dead."
If it is, the court should sign the death certificate. It should next consider what is to be done for the members of the family. Finally, it
should take up the task of untangling the property interests created by
the family relationship. Thus, the family would be dissolved, and not
battled, out of existence.
"An argument can be made that one reason why the law and administration in the
domestic relations field has lagged is due in part to the failure of the law schools to
emphasize the importance of this branch. Commercial and public law courses are emphasized, and progress in these fields of law is notable.
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B. Annulment Concept
The legal concept to be used in place of divorce should be annulment. There are several persuasive reasons for suggesting this particular label. There is no need to institute an entirely new concept when
there is a satisfactory one already in existence. An entirely new concept
would take a long time to invent and shape. Annulment is a traditional,
flexible, ecclesiastical concept. Divorce is a younger, comparatively more
rigid child of the civil law. The ecclesiastical courts found that their
device worked well. True, the setting in which the church courts functioned was different from that in which the new family court would
operate; but there is still a considerable accumulation of experience behind annulment upon which the newer courts could draw.
Annulment is a flexible device.2 It lends itself to judicial experimentation even more than does the fairly rigid statutory divorce. The
ecclesiastical courts showed remarkable resourcefulness in molding it to
accomplish practical results.
There is no reason to assume that the
proposed civil courts would be staffed with less competent judges. In
the present day, the experience of New York State in its use of annulment is promising.24 Flexibility in the basic device is important, because we need not merely to bring our remedy up to date, but to maintain it constantly at peak efficiency in a rapidly-changing world.
If it be objected that traditionally annulment was used to correct
difficulties which arose before marriage, while divorce was regarded as
the appropriate remedy for subversive events arising after the ceremony,
the answer is that the distinction is largely a matter of historical accident. The church courts did not allow what we speak of as divorce
because to them, marriage was indissoluble except by death. They
did allow separation. Today, separation is frequently used as a basis
for securing a determination of the ancillary problems in a family dissolution--support, custody of children, and the like.2 5 But there seems
to be no basic reason other than custom which would prevent the pro"'For a discussion of the historical growth of annulment in the United States, see
SPECA, JURISDICTION IN CASES OF ANNULMENT OF MARRIAGE, PAST AND PRESENT

-(un-

published thesis in the Library of School of Law of Duke University 1952). See also
Kingsley, What Are the Proper Grounds for Granting Annulments?, is LAW & CONTEMP. PROB. 39 (1953).

'"See Davies, Matrimonial Relief in English Law, in A
344

CENTURY OF FAMILY LAW

957).

"The statutes of the various states are collected in JACOBS AND GOEBEL, CASES AND
MATERiAus ON DOMESTIC RELATIONS io98 ( 3 d ed. 1952).
"'See JACOBS AND GOEBEL, op. cit. supra note 24, at 1S.
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posed civil court from extending the concept of annulment to cover disruptive factors that arise after as well as before the marriage ceremony.
The more important problems in a civil court are the nature and extent
of the disruption, and not the time when it arose.
If the court were to adopt this concept of annulment, the change
would not be a mere quibbling over words or a matter of semantics.
Rather, the step would indicate a return to fundamentals and a reexamination of the proper basis for dissolving a family. It is suggested
that when the family is found to be "dead," it is of secondary importance,
in deciding upon the disposition of the particular remains, whether the
death was caused by one or another reason. Statistically, we may be
interested in adultery, cruelty, desertion, and all the other faults. Humanely, however, our concern is with the future of the present parties
even more than their past-what is to become of them? Neither is it
fatal to the proposal to suggest that various religious denominations
associate the marriage relationship with peculiarly sacred concepts. The
layman may find some support in the sort of reasoning which argues
that if God hath really joined H and W together, no man will ever
be able to put them asunder. We may temporally believe that the
Deity has approved the union, but if the subsequent events disprove
the assumption, we should be willing to recognize that we were the
ones who were mistaken.
If it be objected that a strict construction of the annulment theory
might bastardize children and deprive the supposed "wife" of support,
the answer is that legislation or rule of court to avert this consequence
is no novelty.
Annulment can accomplish for us all that is now secured through
divorce, and more. With annulment as the concept, we are free to work
out a modern approach to family dissolution.
C. Unfitness
We have noted the undesirability of fault between the spouses as a
basis for granting a divorce. If we are to grant annulments, they need
not follow this tradition. In fact, it would be better if they did not.
In place of fault, the present proposal is to use the ground of "unfitness." This word requires some explanation.
Fault between the spouses may be appropriate when the point at
issue is the distribution of family, or other property, as between the
spouses. But where the matter to be determined is whether the family

VOL. 1959: 217]

WHY DIVORCE?

is or is not "dead" and what is to be done for the members, we are also
dealing with the loosening of the bond which relates the spouses to the
State. This is a public matter and calls for public handling. Family
dissolution represents the failure of the spouses to establish an enduring
family. There is an indication of lack of fitness for the job.
The private relations of H and W are determined, so far as they
can be, by certain allegations and promises, express and implied, which
each makes to the other. The marriage ceremony becomes the symbol
of this private bond, and we are not primarily concerned with it. Rather
we are concerned with the public bond made between the spouses and
the State. This bond is based on certain allegations and promises made
by the spouses to the State. Its symbol is the marriage license. H and
W, for this purpose, are to be considered as licensees, very special ones,
to be sure, but licensees, nevertheless. In order to obtain the license,
they are required to possess at least minimal standard qualifications.
If the standard is not satisfied, the license is refused. If the allegations
appear to be true but later turn out otherwise, at present, the aggrieved
spouse can take action, but the deceived State presently would seem to
have no remedy. Something should be done to provide the State with
power to deal with such matters not by way of dissolving a family on
its own initiative, but in the way of protecting itself and its institutions
from those who are not of standard marriage calibre and who, in spite of
unfitness, desire to try one marriage after another, only to wreck it.
The applicants for a marriage license expressly or impliedly allege
to the license clerk that they are "fit" not only privately for marriage
to each other, but publicly as licensees of the State in a most responsible
relationship, and that they will remain "fit" for the responsibilities which
a democratic society continues to expect of its families. The State holds
them out as qualified. If there is obvious unfitness at the time of application or if latent unfitness develops later, the State, however the case
arises, should have power to grant annulment.
Marriage is a high estate. It should be considered a privilege to be
married. Those who achieve this estate should have reason to be proud
of their standing in the community.. They should feel some obligation
to the State which licenses them as fit, as well as to the other partner with
whom the experiment in family building is undertaken. If the State
does not make clear that it regards the issuance of a marriage license as
something of a franchise during good behavior, a privilege coupled-with
conditions, the issuance of the license will be effective for little more
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than purposes of recording and establishing of property rights, or perhaps as another source of revenue.
The proposal of compulsory marital fitness is not entirely unique.
It is in some ways comparable to the idea which supports the screening
process affecting those who seek admission to the legal profession. 26
The license enables the lawyer to make a living. It also distinguishes
the holder as a quasi-public official, with duties to public, court, client,
and profession. 2 7 The right to practice law is not a property right.
Rather, it is a privilege coupled with conditions. 2 The admission requirements are not merely a matter of licensing a man to perform a
trade. Rather, they are an examination into the qualifications of applicants for membership in a profession. Those who are granted the privilege are encouraged to maintain at all times a high standard of conduct.
Courts insist that they have inherent power to determine who their
officers shall be.30 In a similar manner, the State may assume the task
of granting a license to marry as an admission to a quasi-professional
class and, if unfitness develops, of revoking the license-not for fault, but
for unfitness.
" See generally REPORTS OF CONSULTANT AND THE ADVISORY AND EDITORIAL COMm17TE ON BAR EXAmINATIONS AND REQUIREMENTS FOR ADmISSION TO THE BAR
(1952).
" DRINMER, LEGAL ETHICS 59 (1953): "By his admission to the Bar, the lawyer is

granted the exclusive right: (x) to hold himself out as a lawyer; (2) as such to advise
clients and to represent them as an advocate; (3) to appear for them in court proceedings." In recognition of these exclusive privileges the lawyer is charged with certain
obligations to the public, to the courts, to his client, to other lawyers.
" "The practice of law is a privilege rather than a natural or vested right." In re
Harrison, 231 Ind. 665, 667-68, 1o9 N.E.2d 722, 723 (1953). "This privilege is
contingent upon the faithful performance of the duties imposed upon the attorney by
the society which grants him the privilege. The first and continuing requirement of an
attorney is that he be of good moral character.

. .

.

Being of good moral character

necessarily implies that he will conform to the moral standards of his profession as
provided (i) by law, (2) by his oath of office, and (3) the coded ethics of the legal
profession." Higginson v. State, 236 Ind. 617, 6zo, 142 N.E.2d 432, 434 (1957).
'Report on Rates for Admission to the Bar, ig LAW. GUILD REV. 58 (1958).
" In re Rerat, 232 Minn. 1, 4, 44 N.W.2d 273, 275 (195o): "However, disciplinary
proceedings are sui generis. The object of the proceeding is not to punish the offender,
but to protect the court in the interest of the public good. In re Application for Discipline of Rerat, 224 Minn. 124, 127, a8 N.W.ad 168, 172. Its purpose is to
guard the administration of justice, In re Application of Smith for Reinstatement,
22o Minn. 197, 19 N.W.2d 324; In re Disbarment of Greathouse, x89 Minn. 51,
248 N.W. 735, so that the judicial system does not fall into disrespect. Thus, the

question before the court is the fitness of the attorney to continue as a member of the
legal profession.... 1
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CONCLUSION

We have criticized divorce as a concept to be used in connection with
the dissolution of families. We have suggested that in its place the
older and more flexible concept of annulment should be used in a setting
where the court has full authority to develop its implications and where
the proceedings will be individualized and nonadversary. In this,
we are switching from a civil law device to one which originated in the
ecclesiastical law. Since we cannot bring back the context of the middle
ages, it is necessary for us to create a setting of our own as near as possible
to that in which annulment was originally developed and, at the same
time, appropriate to modern changing conditions. The word "fiduciary"
is acceptable as being descriptive, provided we recognize various grades
of fiduciary relationships, with marriage at a higher level than that
binding, for example, attorney and dient.
In adopting this new concept, the individualized family court will
play a substantial role. It should be a role of creation, of challenge,
and, therefore, attractive to forward-looking lawyers. It should supplant
the divorce concept of fault with another which, to a degree, at least
equates marriage.status with professional status. Under this proposal,
the continuance of the family will depend upon fitness for the status.
This means that in order to decree a family dissolution, the court will
have intentionally to break two bonds. One of them will be a private
bond between H and TV, the other will be a public bond between the
spouses and the State.
Adoption of this new proposal should enable us to short-circuit an
unedifying past and, in effect, start from scratch with respect to family
dissolution.

